A heterogeneous resource, such as a land-estate, is already divided among several agents in an unfair way. It should be re-divided among the agents in a way that balances fairness with ownership rights. We present re-division protocols that attain various trade-off points between fairness and ownership rights, in various settings differing in the geometric constraints on the allotments: (a) no geometric constraints; (b) connectivity -the cake is a one-dimensional interval and each piece must be a contiguous interval; (c) rectangularity -the cake is a two-dimensional rectangle or rectilinear polygon and the pieces should be rectangles; (d) convexity -the cake is a two-dimensional convex polygon and the pieces should be convex. Our re-division protocols have implications on another problem: the price-of-fairness -the loss of social welfare caused by fairness requirements. Each protocol implies an upper bound on the price-of-fairness with the respective geometric constraints.
Introduction
Fair division of land and other resources among agents with different preferences has been an important issue since Biblical times. Today it is an active area of research in the interface of computer science [Robertson and Webb, 1998; Procaccia, 2015; Brânzei, 2015; Segal-Halevi, 2017] and economics [Moulin, 2004; Young, 1995] . Its applications range from politics [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brams, 2007] to multi-agent systems [Chevaleyre et al., 2006] .
The classic setting assumes a one-shot division: the resource is divided once and for all, like a cake that is divided and eaten soon after it comes out of the oven. But in practice, it is often required to re-divide an already-divided resource. One example is a cloud-computing environment, where new agents come and require resources held by other agents. A second example is fair allocation of radio spectrum among several broadcasting agencies: it may be required to re-divide the frequencies to accommodate new broadcasters. A third example is land-reform: large land-estates are held by a small number of landlords, and the government may want to redivide them to landless citizens.
In the classic one-shot division setting, there are n agents with equal rights, and the goal is to give each agent a fair share of the cake. A common definition of a "fair share" is a piece worth at least 1/n of the total cake value, according to the agent's personal valuation function. This fairness requirement is usually termed proportionality. When proportionality cannot be attained, it is often (see Section 7) relaxed to r-proportionality, which means that each agent receives at least a fraction r/n of the total, where r ∈ (0, 1) is constant independent of n.
In contrast, in the re-division setting, there is an existing division of the cake among the n agents. This division is not necessarily fair; in particular, there may be some agents whose allocation is empty. When the cake is re-divided, it may be required to give extra rights to current holders. In particular, it may be required to give each agent the opportunity to keep a substantial fraction of its current value. This may be due either to efficiency reasons (in the cloud computing scenario) or economic reasons (in the radio spectrum scenario) or political reasons (in the land-reform scenario). We call this requirement ownership. Given a constant w ∈ (0, 1), wownership means that each agent receives at least w times its old value. What levels of proportionality and ownership can be attained simultaneously? Our first two results (in Section 3) provide an almost complete answer to this question. Proposition 1. For every constants r, w ∈ [0, 1] where r + w > 1, it may be impossible to simultaneously guarantee rproportionality and w-ownership.
Theorem 2. For every constants r, w ∈ [0, 1] where r + w ≤ 1, and for every existing division of the cake, there exists a division that simultaneously satisfies r-proportionality and wownership. Moreover, when r, w are constant rational numbers, such a division can be found with O(n 2 ) queries.
As an example, taking r = w = 1/2, it is possible to re-divide the cake, giving each agent at least half its previous value, while simultaneously giving each agent at least 1/(2n) of the total cake value.
The parameters r, w represent the level of balance between two principles: large r means more emphasis on fairness while large w means more emphasis on ownership rights. The above theorems imply that the re-dividers (e.g. the govern-ment) may choose any level of fairness and ownership-rights that fit their ideological, political or economic goals, as long as the sum of these fractions is at most 1.
The balance parameters can also be given probabilistic interpretation. Suppose the government wants to do a land reform and needs the agreement of the current landowners. Naturally, the current landowners do not want to give away their lands. However, they may fear that, without land-reform, the landless citizens might revolt and they might lose all their lands. If the landowners believe that the probability of a successful revolt is 1 − w, then they will agree to a land-reform that guarantees w-ownership. Theorem 2 implies that, in this case, it is possible to carry out a land-reform that guarantees (1 − w)-proportionality.
While Theorem 2 is encouraging, it ignores an important aspect of practical division problems: geometry. The division it guarantees may be highly fractioned, giving each agent a large number of disconnected pieces. In many practical division problems, the agents may want to receive a single connected piece. For example, when the divided resource is a time-interval, each agent may need a single contiguous interval rather than a large number of disconnected ones. Can partial-proportionality and partial-ownership be attained simultaneously with a connectivity constraint? The following proposition (proved in Section 4) answers this negatively.
Proposition 3. When the cake is a 1-dimensional interval and each piece must be an interval, for every positive constants r, w ∈ (0, 1), it may be impossible to simultaneously satisfy r-proportionality and w-ownership. Moreover, for every r > 0 and every integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there might be k agents who, in any r-proportional division, receive at most a fraction 1/ n k of their old value. The latter part of the proposition involves a property much weaker than proportionality: all we want is to guarantee each agent a positive value. With the connectivity constraint, even this weak "positivity" requirement is incompatible with wownership for every constant w > 0: a positive division might require us to give one agent at most 1/n of its previous value, give two agents at most 2/n of their previous value, give n/3 agents at most 1/3 of their previous value, etc. Proposition 3 motivates the following weaker ownership requirement: for every k, at least n − k agents receive at least a fraction 1/ n k of their old value. For example (taking k = n/3 and assuming all quotients are integers), at least 2n/3 agents should receive at least 1/3 of their old value. This criterion is inspired by the "90th percentile" criterion common in Service-Level-Agreements and Quality-of-Service analysis, e.g. [Zhang et al., 2014; Delimitrou and Kozyrakis, 2014] . It can also be justified by political reasoning: in a democratic country, it may be sufficient to win the support of a sufficiently large majority.
Our following results almost match this relaxed ownership criterion. Formally, the democratic ownership property means that, for every integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, at least n − k agents receive at least a fraction 1/ n k of their previous value. Democratic-ownership is almost the same as the upper bound implied by Proposition 3; the only difference is that in the upper bound the fraction is rounded down (1/ n k ) while in democratic-ownership the fraction is rounded up.
Theorem 4. When the cake is a 1-dimensional interval and each piece must be an interval, it is possible to find in time O(n 2 log n) a division simultaneously satisfying democraticownership and 1/3-proportionality.
It is an open question whether democratic-ownership is compatible with r-proportionality for some r > 1/3.
Theorem 4, like most cake-cutting papers, assumes that the cake is 1-dimensional. In realistic division scenarios, the cake is often 2-dimensional and the pieces should have a pre-specified geometric shape, such as a rectangle or a convex polygon. Rectangularity and convexity requirements are sensible when dividing land, exhibition space in museums, advertisement space in newspapers and even virtual space in web-pages. Moreover, in the frequency-range allocation problem, it is possible to allocate frequency ranges for a limited time-period; the frequency-time space is twodimensional and it makes sense to require that the "pieces" are rectangles in this space [Iyer and Huhns, 2009] .
2-dimensional cake-cutting introduces new challenges over the traditional 1-dimensional setting. As an example, in one dimension, it can be assumed that the initial allocation is a partition of the entire cake; this is without loss of generality, since any "blank" (unallocated part) can be attached to a neighboring allocated interval without harming its shape or value. However, in two dimensions, the initial allocation might contain blanks that cannot be attached to any allocated piece due to the rectangularity or convexity constraints. For example, suppose the cake is as the rectangle illustrated to the right. There are 4 agents and each agent i has positive valuedensity only inside the rectangle Z i . The most reasonable division (e.g. the only Pareto-efficient division) is to give each Z i entirely to agent i. But, this allocation leaves a blank in the center of the cake, and this blank cannot be attached to any allocated piece due to the rectangularity constraint. This counter-intuitive scenario cannot happen in a one-dimensional cake. Handling such cases requires new geometry-based tools. Using such tools we can handle two common 2-dimensional settings (Section 5):
Theorem 5. When the cake is a rectangle and each piece must be a parallel rectangle, it is possible to find in time O(n 2 log n) a division simultaneously satisfying democraticownership and 1/4-proportionality.
Theorem 6. When the cake is a 2-dimensional convex polygon and each piece must be convex, there exists a division simultaneously satisfying democratic-ownership and 1/5-proportionality.
Remark 7. In the interval, rectangle and convex settings, the geometric constraints are mostly harmless without the ownership requirement: when the cake is an interval/rectangle/convex, classic algorithms for proportional cake-cutting, such as Even and Paz [1984] , can be easily made to return interval/rectangle/convex pieces by ensuring that the cuts are parallel. Similarly, the ownership requirement is easy to satisfy without the geometric constraints, as shown by Theorem 2. It is the combination of these two requirements that leads to interesting challenges.
Our next result generalizes Theorem 5 to a cake that is a rectilinear polygon -a polygon all whose angles are 90
• or 270
• . Rectilinearity is a common assumption in polygon partition problems [Keil, 2000] . The "complexity" of a rectilinear polygon is characterized by the number of its reflex vertices -vertices with a 270
• angle. We denote the cake complexity by T . A rectangle -the simplest rectilinear polygon -has T = 0. The cake below has T = 4 reflex vertices (circled):
Theorem 8. When the cake is a rectilinear polygon with T reflex vertices, and each piece must be a rectangle, it is possible to find in time O(n 2 log n + poly(T )) a division satisfying democratic-ownership, in which each agent receives at least 1/(4n + T ) of the total cake value. 
Application: bounding the price-of-fairness
Redivision protocols can be used not only to compromise between old and new agents, but also to compromise between fairness and efficiency. Often, the most economicallyefficient allocation is not fair, while a fair allocation is not economically-efficient. The trade-off between fairness and efficiency is quantified by the price-of-fairness [Bertsimas et al., 2011; Bertsimas et al., 2012; Caragiannis et al., 2012; Aumann and Dombb, 2010] . It is defined as the worst-case ratio of the maximum attainable social-welfare to the maximum attainable social-welfare of a fair allocation. The social welfare is usually defined as the arithmetic mean of the agents' values (also called utilitarian welfare) or their geometric mean (also called Nash welfare [Moulin, 2004] ).
A redivision protocol can be used to calculate an upper bound on the price of fairness in the following way. Take a welfare-maximizing allocation as the initial allocation; use 1 The guarantee of 1/(4n + T ) is calculated as a fraction of the total cake value. However, with a rectilinear cake and a rectangular piece, even a single agent cannot always get the entire cake value to itself. Therefore, one could think of an alternative guarantee where the benchmark for each agent is the largest value that this agent can attain in a rectangle. For example, we could guarantee each agent a fraction 1/(4n) of the value of its most valuable rectangle. However, such guarantee might be much worse than the guarantee of Theorem 8. The proof in Appendix A implies that the value of the most valuable rectangle might be as small as 1/(T + 1) of the total cake value. Therefore, the alternative guarantee of 1/(4n) this value translates to a guarantee of 1/(O(n · T )) -much worse than the 1/(O(n + T )) guaranteed by Theorem 8. a redivision protocol to produce a partially-proportional allocation in which the utility of each agent is close to its initial utility; conclude that the new welfare is close to the initial (maximal) welfare.
Without geometric constraints, we have the following upper bound: Theorem 9. For every r ∈ [0, 1], the utilitarian-price of rproportionality is at most 1/(1 − r).
Note that when r = 1, the bound is infinity. Indeed, [Caragiannis et al., 2012] proved that the price of 1-proportionality in this setting is Θ( √ n), which is not bounded by any constant. Our results show that by making a small compromise on the level of proportionality we can get a constant (independent of n) bound on the utilitarian-price. The parameter r sets the level of trade-off between fairness and efficiency.
With geometric constraints, we have the following upper bounds: Theorem 10. When the cake is an interval and each piece must be an interval, for every B ≥ 3:
• The utilitarian-price of (1/B)-proportionality is O( √ n); • The Nash-price of (1/B)-proportionality is at most 8.4. Theorem 11. When the cake is a rectangle and each piece must be a rectangle, for every B ≥ 4:
• The utilitarian-price of (1/B)-proportionality is O( √ n); • The Nash-price of (1/B)-proportionality is at most 11.2. Theorem 12. When the cake is convex polygon and each piece must be convex, ∀B ≥ 5:
• The utilitarian-price of (1/B)-proportionality is O( √ n); • The Nash-price of (1/B)-proportionality is at most 14.
Note that the first claim in Theorem 10 is subsumed by Aumann and Dombb [2010] , who prove that the utilitarianprice of 1-proportionality in this setting is Θ( √ n). We bring this claim only for completeness. The second claim in this theorem, as well as the following theorems which deal with two-dimensional constraints, are not implied by previous results.
Model 2.1 Cake division
The cake C is a polytope in the d-dimensional Euclidean plane R d . In this paper we focus on the common cases in which d = 1 and C is an interval, or d = 2 and C is a polygon. A piece is a Borel subset of C.
C has to be divided among n ≥ 1 agents. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a value-density function v i , which is an integrable, non-negative and bounded function on C. The value of a piece X i to agent i is marked by V i (X i ) and it is the integral of its value-density:
The definition implies that the V i are finite measures and are absolutely-continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, i.e., any piece with zero area has zero value to all agents. Therefore, we do not need to worry about who gets the boundary of a piece, since its value is 0.
The division protocols access the value measures via queries [Robertson and Webb, 1998; Woeginger and Sgall, 2007] : an eval query asks an agent to reveal its value for a specified piece of cake; a mark query asks an agent to mark a piece of cake with a specified value.
The present paper ignores strategic considerations and assumes that agents answer truthfully. Indeed, in general it may be impossible to build a cake-cutting protocol that is both fair and strategy-proof [Brânzei and Miltersen, 2015] .
The geometric constraints, if any, are represented by a prespecified family S of usable pieces. In this paper, S will either be the set of all pieces (which means that there are no geometric constraints), or the set of all intervals, or the set of all rectangles, or the set of all convex pieces. We assume that each agent can use only a single piece from the family S.
An allocation is a vector of n pieces, X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), one piece per agent, such that the X i are pairwise-disjoint and ∪ n i=1 X i ⊆ C. Note that some cake may remain unallocated, i.e, free disposal is assumed. We explained in the introduction why this may be important. An S-allocation is an allocation in which all pieces are usable, i.e, ∀i :
For every constant r ∈ (0, 1), an allocation X is called rproportional if every agent receives at least r/n of the total cake value:
A 1-proportional division is also known as "proportional".
Cake redivision
There is an existing S-allocation of the cake: Z 1 , . . . , Z n . It is assumed that the old pieces Z j are pairwise-disjoint and ∀j : Z j ∈ S, but nothing else is assumed on the division. In particular, the initial division is not necessarily proportional, and some of C may be undivided. It is required to create a new S-allocation of C to all agents: X 1 , . . . , X n . For every constant w ∈ (0, 1), the re-allocation satisfies the w-ownership property if every agent receives at least a fraction w of its old value:
Since w-ownership is not always compatible with rproportionality for any r > 0, we define the following weaker property. A re-allocation satisfies the democratic-ownership property if, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there are at least n − k agents j ∈ {1, . . . , n} for whom:
Social-welfare and Price-of-fairness
In addition to fairness, it is often required that a division has a high social welfare. The social welfare of an allocation is a certain aggregate function of the normalized values of the agents (the normalized value is the piece value divided by the total cake value). Common social welfare functions are sum (utilitarian) and product (Nash) [Moulin, 2004] . We normalize them such that the maximum welfare is 1:
• Utilitarian welfare -the arithmetic mean of the agents' normalized values:
• Nash welfare -the geometric mean of the agents' normalized values:
The goal of maximizing the social welfare is not always compatible with the goal of guaranteeing a fair share to every agent. For example, Caragiannis et al.
[2012] describe a simple example in which the maximum utilitarian welfare of a proportional allocation is O(1/n) while the maximum utilitarian welfare of an arbitrary (unfair) allocation is O(1/ √ n). This means that society has to pay a price, in terms of socialwelfare, for insisting on fairness. This is called the price of fairness. Formally, given a social welfare function W and a fairness criterion F , the price-of-fairness relative to W and F (also called: "the W -price-of-F ") is the ratio:
where the supremum at the nominator is over all allocations X and the supremum at the denominator is over all allocations Y that also satisfy the fairness criterion F . The cited example shows that the utilitarian-price-of-proportionality might be Ω( √ n). When there are geometric constraints, they affect both the numerator and the denominator of (*), i.e, the suprema are taken only on S-allocations. Therefore, it is not a-priori clear whether the price-of-fairness with constraints is higher or lower than without constraints.
Arbitrary Cake and Arbitrary Pieces
In this section there are no geometric constraints on the cake or its pieces. We start with the negative result.
Proof of Proposition 1. We are given a pair r, w where r + w > 1. We show a scenario where no r-proportional division satisfies w-ownership. In the initial allocation, a single agent owns the entire cake. All n agents have the same value-density and they value the entire cake as 1. In any rproportional division, the n − 1 landless citizens must receive a total value of (n−1)r/n = r−r/n. Therefore the old landlord receives at most 1 − r + r/n. By assumption, 1 − r < w. Hence, if n is sufficiently large, the old landlord receives less than w of his previous value, contradicting w-ownership.
To prove the matching positive result we need a lemma. Lemma 13. Given cake-allocations Z and Y and a constant r ∈ [0, 1], there exists an allocation X such that, for every agent i:
Moreover, when r is a constant rational number, X can be found using O(n 2 ) queries.
Proof. We first give an existential proof. Consider the set of all possible cake-partitions. For each cake-partition, consider the n×1 vector of utilities of the agents. The Dubins-Spanier theorem [Dubins and Spanier, 1961] implies that the set of all such vectors is convex. Therefore, there exists an allocation X satisfying the requirement as an equality: ∀i :
Since the Dubins-Spanier theorem [Dubins and Spanier, 1961] is not constructive, we give here a constructive protocol for creating the allocation Z when r is a rational number, r = p/q with p < q some positive integers. For every pair of agents i, j (including i = j), the protocol does:
Step 1. Agent i divides Z i ∩ Y j to q equal-value pieces.
Step 2. Agent j takes the p best pieces in its eyes.
Step 3. Agent i takes the remaining q − p pieces. (Note, when i = j agent i gets the entire piece Z i ∩ Y i ).
The pairs i, j can be processed in any order, even in parallel.
Each agent i is allocated a piece X i which is a union of nq pieces: np pieces that agent i took from other agents (including itself) in piece Y i and n(q − p) pieces that were left for agent i from other agents in piece Z i . From every piece Y i ∩ Z j (for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}), agent i picks the best p out of q pieces, which give it a value of at least
Its total value in these np pieces is thus at least rV i (Y i ). In addition, from every piece Z i ∩Y j (for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}), agent i receives q − p out of q equal pieces, which give it a value of exactly
Its total value of these n(q − p) pieces is thus exactly (1 − r)V i (Z i ). The three steps are done once for each pair of agents, so the number of queries is O(n 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a pair r, w where r + w ≤ 1, apply Lemma 13, with the initial allocation as Z, and any proportional allocation as Y (a proportional allocation can be found efficiently by classic protocols such as Steinhaus [1948] , Even and Paz [1984] ). By Lemma 13, the new division satisfies r-proportionality and (1−r)-ownership, and 1 − r ≥ w.
Remark 14. The O(n 2 ) complexity assumes the integers p, q are constant (not part of the input). If they are considered part of the input, then the complexity becomes linear in q which is exponential in the number of input bits. The number of queries can be reduced using concepts from number theory, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. See McAvaney et al. [1992] , Robertson and Webb [1998] .
Remark 15. Our redivision protocol gives each agent a piece that is not only worth at least (1 − r)V i (Z i ), but also a subset of Z i (in addition to a subset of Y i ). This may be desirable in some cases. E.g. in land division, old landlords may want not only a high value but also a subset of their old plot.
Interval Cake and Interval Pieces
In this section the cake is an interval and each piece must be an interval. Again we start with the negative result.
Proof of Proposition 3. We are given an initial allocation Z, a positive constant r ∈ (0, 1), and an integer k ≤ n. We show a scenario in which, in every r-proportional allocation, the value of every agent j ∈ {1, . . . , k} is at most V j (Z j )/ n k . Assume that the valuations are as follows. Each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , k} values his original piece Z j as n k and the rest of the cake as 0. The value-density of j in Z j is piecewiseuniform: It has n k regions with a value of 1 and n k − 1 "gaps" -regions with a value of 0. The other n − k agents are divided to k groups of roughly equal size: the size of each group is either
Each agent in group j assigns a positive value only to a unique gap in the piece Z j (so when the group size is n k − 1, each gap is wanted by exactly one agent; otherwise, there is one gap wanted by two agents). The following figure illustrates the value-densities that are positive in piece Z 1 . The solid boxes represent the value-density of agent #1; each dotted box represents a value-density of a single agent in group #1.
In any r-proportional division, each gap in Z j must be at least partially allocated to an agent in group j. Hence, the interval allocated to agent j must contain at most a single positive region in Z j -it is not allowed to overlap any gap. Therefore the value of agent j is at most
To prove the matching positive result (Theorem 4), we use a protocol for fair division of an "archipelago" -a cake made of one or more interval "islands".
Lemma 16. Let C be a cake made of m ≥ 1 pairwisedisjoint intervals: C = Z 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Z m . There exists a division X of C among n agents, in which (a) Each agent i receives an interval entirely contained in one of the islands: ∀i : ∃j : X i ⊆ Z j , and (b) Each agent receives a value of at least V i (C)/(n + m − 1). Moreover, X can be found using O(mn log n) queries.
Proof. We normalize the valuations of all agents such that ∀i : V i (C) = n + m − 1. We aim to give each agent a piece worth at least 1. The proof is by induction on m. When m = 1, divide the single island among all agents using the EvenPaz protocol [Even and Paz, 1984] . It finds, using O(n log n) queries, a connected division in which each agent receives value at least V i (C)/n = 1.
When m > 1, pick an arbitrary island, say Z 1 . Pick the n agents whose valuations of Z 1 are the highest, where n is chosen such that all these agents value Z 1 as at least n . Divide Z 1 among them using Even-Paz, giving each of them value at least 1. It can be shown that the remaining n − n agents value the remaining m − 1 islands as at least (n − n ) + (m − 1) − 1; divide the islands recursively among them.
There are m steps, so the runtime is O(mn log n).
Remark. The fraction of 1/(n + m − 1), guaranteed by Lemma 16, is the largest that can be guaranteed. To see this, assume that all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , n} have the same valuemeasures -they value the islands Z 1 , . . . , Z m−1 as 1 and the island Z m as n (so their total cake value is n + m − 1). The piece of every agent must be entirely contained in a single island. If any agent receives a piece in islands Z 1 , . . . , Z m−1 , then that agent receives a value of at most 1. Otherwise, if all n agents receive a piece in Z m , then the value of at least one agent is at most 1. In both cases, at least one agent receives at most 1/(n + m − 1) the total value.
Proof of Theorem 4. We re-divide the interval as follows.
Step 1. Given the original partial allocation Z 1 ∪ · · · Z n ⊆ C, extend it to a complete allocation Z 1 ∪ · · · Z n = C, by attaching each "blank" (unallocated interval in C) arbitrarily to one of the two adjacent allocated intervals. This, of course, does not harm the old values: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
Step 2. For each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, add a "helper agent" j * and assign it a value-density function v * j :
Use the protocol of Lemma 16 with n + n agents, regarding the cake C as an archipelago and the pieces Z 1 , . . . , Z n as the islands.
Step 3. Give each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} either the interval allocated to its normal agent j or the interval allocated to its helper agent j * , whichever is more valuable.
We now prove that the resulting allocation is 1/3-proportional and satisfies the democratic-ownership property.
(a) Proof of 1/3-proportionality. We apply Lemma 16 with 2n agents and m = n islands. Each of the 2n agents receives an interval contained in one of the pieces Z 1 , . . . , Z n , with a value of at least 1/((2n) + n − 1) its total cake value. This value is larger than 1/(3n).
(b) Proof of democratic-ownership. We focus on the n helper agents. First, by Lemma 16, every helper agent j * must receive an interval contained in Z j , since its value is positive only in the island Z j . Moreover, by the pigeonhole principle, for every integer k ≤ n, at most k islands are populated by at least n k normal agents. Hence, at least n − k islands are populated by at most n k −1 normal agents. Adding the helper agent, these islands are populated by at most n k agents. Hence, the proportional allocation in Lemma 16 gives these helper agents an interval subset of Z j , which is worth for agent j at least V j (Z j )/ n k . Remark. Continuing Remark 15, note that the above algorithm gives each agent an option to take a subset of his old plot -the one allocated to his helper agent. However, in some cases the old plot of an agent might become very crowded. In an extreme case, all n − 1 other agents might want a piece only inside this specific plot. In such cases, the value that remains to the helper agent might be as low as 1/n of the original plot value. To handle such cases, the algorithm allows the agent to pick another piece -the piece allocated to its normal agent -if it is more valuable than the share of the helper agent.
Polygonal Cake and Polygonal Pieces
Rectangle cake and pieces We assume that C is a rectangle in R 2 . Each piece Z j in the initial division is a rectangle parallel to C and each piece X i in the new division must be a rectangle parallel to C.
The Even-Paz protocol can easily be adapted to this setting, by instructing each agent to make vertical cuts parallel to the rectangle's sides. Thus Lemma 16 and steps #2 and #3 in the protocol of Theorem 4 work in this setting too.
The problem is that Step #1, the allocation-completion step, is no longer trivial. We cannot just attach each unallocated part of C to an allocated rectangle, since the result might not be a rectangle. We still need to extend the initial partial allocation Z 1 ∪ · · · Z n ⊆ C to a complete allocation, but the number of rectangles in the complete allocation might be larger than n, since we might have unattached blanks.
Our goal, then, is to find a partition of C to rectangles, Z 1 ∪ · · · Z n+b = C, with b ≥ 0, such that every input rectangle is contained in a unique output rectangle: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Z j ⊆ Z j . The additional b rectangles are called blanks. In
Step 3, we will have m = n + b islands and 2n agents, so the value guarantee per agent will be 1/((2n) + (n + b) − 1) = 1/(3n + b − 1); therefore, we would like the number of blanks b to be as small as possible. An example of the input and output of the allocation-completion step is shown below. Here, b = 1 since there is one blank -Z 5 .
⇒
We replace step #1 with the following:
Step 1'. Let i loop over the agents in an arbitrary order, e.g, i = 1, . . . , n. extend Z i in all four directions to the maximum extent without intersecting the other Z i 's. By construction, the resulting arrangement is maximal -no rectangle can be extended any further without overlapping other rectangles. Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] show that, in any maximal arrangement, the number of rectangular blanks b is at most m−2 √ m−O(1). Plugging this into the protocol of Theorem 4 gives a value per agent of at least 1/(4n − 2 √ n) > 1/(4n), satisfying 1/4-proportionality and proving Theorem 5. Remark. Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] prove that the number m − 2 √ m − O(1) is worst-case optimal, i.e, there are arrangements with exactly this number of blanks. However, they do not prove that the greedy extension algorithm is optimal in any case. In theory, in some cases, it may be possible to extend the rectangles in a way that leaves a smaller number of blanks. This optimization problem is left to future work.
Convex cake and pieces
The situation is similar when C is convex and the pieces should be convex. The Even-Paz protocol can operate on a convex cake, requiring the agents to make cuts parallel to the each other. This guarantees that the pieces will be convex. In Step #1, a similar challenge arises. We have an initial partial allocation Z 1 ∪ · · · Z n ⊆ C, where each Z j is convex. We need a complete allocation Z 1 ∪ · · · Z n+b = C, where each Z j is convex, every input piece is contained in a unique output piece, and the number of blanks b is minimal.
Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] prove that, for every initial allocation Z, there exist a maximal extension where the number of convex blanks b is at most 2m − 5. Plugging this into the protocol of Theorem 4 gives a value per agent of at least 1/(5n − 6) ≥ 1/(5n) in the convex case -satisfying 1/5-proportionality and proving Theorem 6. However, we do not know how to find this maximal extension efficiently; this computational-geometric question is left for future work.
Rectilinear cake and rectangular pieces. There are efficient algorithms for partitioning a rectilinear polygon to a minimal number of rectangles. A rectilinear polygon with T reflex vertices can be partitioned in time O(poly(T )) to at most T + 1 rectangles [Keil, 2000; Eppstein, 2010] , and this bound is tight when the vertices of C are in general position. Our goal is to bound b -the number of blank rectangles. Therefore, it is expected that the bound should depend on T , in addition to m.
Indeed, Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] prove that, in any maximal arrangement of rectangles (such as the one produced by Step 1' above), the number of rectangular blanks is at most m + T − 2 √ m − O(1). Plugging this into the protocol of Theorem 4 gives a value per agent of more than 1/(4n + T ), proving Theorem 8.
Price-of-Fairness Bounds
In this section, our redivision protocols are used to prove upper bounds on the price of partial-proportionality.
Theorem 9 follows directly from Theorem 2 by taking the original division to be a utilitarian-optimal division.
The proofs of Theorems 10, 11 and 12 are similar; only the constants are different. We present below only the proof of Theorem 11; to get the proofs of the other theorems, replace the constant "4" with "3" or "5" respectively.
The first part of Theorem 11 -regarding the utilitarian price -is proved by the following: Lemma 17. Let Z be a utilitarian-optimal rectangular division of a cake C among n agents who value the entire cake C as 1. Let U be the utilitarian welfare of Z:
Then, there exists a (1/4)-proportional rectangular allocation of C to these same n agents with utilitarian welfare W , such that U/W ∈ O(n 1/2 ).
Proof. Apply the redivision protocol of Section 5 to the existing division by setting m = n and treating all n agents as "old". The partial-proportionality guarantee of that protocol ensures that the new division is 1/4-proportional. The partial-ownership of that protocol ensures that for every integer k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there is a set S k containing at least n − k agents whose value is more than max(
). Renumber the agents in the following way. Pick an agent from S n−1 (which contains at least one agent) and number it n − 1. Pick an agent from S n−2 (which contains at least one other agent) and number it n − 2. Continue this way to number the agents by k = n − 1, . . . , 0. Now, the utilitarian welfare of the new division is lower-bounded by:
and the utilitarian welfare ratio is at most:
To get an upper bound on U/W , we find a sequence a 0 , . . . , a n−1 that maximizes
Observation 1. in a maximizing sequence, a 0 = 1 and there is no k > 0 such that a k < 1/k. Proof : Setting such a k to 1/k increases NUM and does not change DEN.
Observation 2. A maximizing sequence must be weaklydecreasing (for all k < k , a k ≥ a k ). Proof : if there exists k < k such that a k < a k , then we can swap a k with a k . This does not change NUM but strictly decreases DEN.
Observation 3. In a maximizing sequence, there is no k > 0 such that 1/k < a k < 1. Proof:
2 If 1/k < a k < 1 then for some sufficiently small > 0, both a k + and a k − are in (1/k, 1) and replacing a k with a k ± makes the ratio strictly smaller than the maximum. Replacing a k with a k + makes the ratio NUM+ DEN+k ; this new ratio is smaller than NUM DEN so · DEN < k · NUM. Replacing a k with a k − makes the ratio NUM− DEN−k ; that new ratio is smaller than NUM DEN so − · DEN < −k · NUM. But the two latter inequalities · DEN < k · NUM and − · DEN < −k · NUM are contradictory. Hence, the assumption 1/k < a k < 1 is false.
Observations 1-3 imply that a maximizing sequence has a very specific format. It is characterized by an integer l ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} such that, for all k ≤ l, a k = 1 and for all k ≥ l + 1, a k = 1/k. So:
where H n = n k=1 (1/k) is the n-th harmonic number. The number l is integer, but the expression is bounded by the maximum attained when l is allowed to be real. By standard calculus we get that the real value of l which maximizes the above expression is l = 2(n − 1) + (H n + 1)(H n + 2) − (H n + 1) = Θ( √ n). Substituting into the above inequality gives:
as claimed.
The second part of Theorem 11 -regarding the Nash price -is proved by the following: Lemma 18. Let Z be a Nash-optimal rectangular division of a cake C among n agents who value the entire cake C as 1. Let U be the Nash welfare of Z (the geometric mean of the values):
Then, there exists a (1/4)-proportional rectangular allocation of C to these same n agents with Nash welfare W , and U/W < 11.2.
Proof. Apply the redivision protocol of Section 5 to redivide the existing n pieces among the n agents. Renumber the agents as in Lemma 17. The Nash welfare of the new division, raised to the n-th power, can be bounded as:
and the ratio of the new welfare to the previous welfare can be bounded as:
The nominator does not depend on the valuations, so the ratio is maximized when the denominator is minimized. This happens when each factor in the product is minimized. The minimal value of the 0-th factor is 1 and the minimal value of the other factors is k. Hence:
n where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Taking the n-
Wolfram Alpha shows that the rightmost term n/2π 1/n is bounded globally by 1.03, so all in all U/W < 1.03 · 4 · e < 11.2 as claimed.
Related Work
Partial proportionality While proportionality is the most common criterion of fair cake-cutting, it is often relaxed to partial-proportionality in order to achieve additional goals:
1. Speed: finding a proportional division takes Θ(n log n) queries, but finding an r-proportional division takes only Θ(n) queries, for some sufficiently small r ≤ 0.1 [Edmonds and Pruhs, 2006; Edmonds et al., 2008] .
2. Improving social welfare: proportional allocations may be socially inefficient; efficiency can be improved by decreasing the value-guarantee per agent [Zivan, 2011; Arzi, 2012] .
3. Minimum-size constraint: In some 1-dimensional settings, each agent may get several intervals but the length of each interval should be above a threshold. It is impossible to guarantee an r-proportional allocation for any r > 0, but additive approximations exist [Caragiannis et al., 2011] .
4. Geometric constraints: For example, when the cake is square and the pieces must be square, it is impossible to guarantee an r-proportional allocation for any r ≥ 1/2, but there is an algorithm that guarantees a 1/4-proportional allocation [Segal-Halevi et al., 2017; Segal-Halevi et al., 2015] .
Dynamic fair division
Our cake redivision problem differs from several division problems studied recently.
1. Dynamic resource allocation [Kash et al., 2013; Friedman et al., 2015] is a common problem in cloud-computing environments. The server has several resources, such as memory and disk-space. Agents (processes) come and depart. The server has to allocate the resources fairly among agents. When new agents come, the server may have to take some resources from existing agents. The goal is to do the reallocation with minimal disruption to existing agents [Friedman et al., 2015] . In these problems, the resources are homogeneous, which means that the only thing that matters is what quantity of each resource is given to each agent. In contrast, our cake is heterogeneous and different agents may have different valuations on it, so our protocol must decide which parts of the cake should be given to which agent.
2. Population monotonicity [Thomson, 1983; Moulin, 1990; Moulin, 2004; Thomson, 2011; Sziklai and SegalHalevi, 2018] is an axiom that describes a desired property of allocation rules. When new agents arrive and the same division rule is re-activated, the value of all old agents should be weakly smaller than before. This axiom represents the virtue of solidarity: if sacrifices have to be made to support an additional agent, then everybody should contribute. We, too, assume that old agents are taking part in supporting the new agents. However, we add the ownership requirement, which means that old agents should be allowed to keep at least some of their previous value. In addition, while their approach is axiomatic and mainly interested in existence results, our approach is constructive and our goal is to provide an actual re-division protocol.
3. Private endowment in economics resource allocation problems means that each agent is endowed with an initial bundle of resources. Then, agents exchange resources using a market mechanism. The classic problem in economics involves homogeneous resources, but it has also been studied in the cake-cutting framework [Berliant and Dunz, 2004; Aziz and Ye, 2014] . A basic requirement in these works is individual rationality, which means that the final value allocated to each agent must be weakly larger than the value of the initial endowment (note the contrast with the population monotonicity axiom). In our problem we do not make this assumption as it is incompatible with fairness: since some agents may initially own no land, individual rationality would mean that they might not receive anything in the exchange.
4. Online division is a setting in which either the agents or the divided resources are not all available at the time of the division, but rather arrive in different times. Walsh [2011] studies the online division of a divisible resource. The motivation is a birthday party in an office, in which some agents come or leave early while others come or leave late. It is required to give some cake to agents who come early while keeping a fair share to those who come late. Aleksandrov et al. [2015] studies the online division of indivisible items. The motivation is the food-bank problem, where a charity organization receives food donations and must decide on-line to whom each donation should be allocated. In contrast to our model, there it is impossible to re-divide allocated resources, since they are consumed by their receivers.
5. Land reform is the re-division of land among citizens. It has been attempted in numerous countries around the globe and in many periods throughout history. Some books on land reform are [Powelson, 1988; Bernstein, 2002; Rosset et al., 2006; Lipton, 2009] . The earliest recorded land-reform was done in ancient Egypt in the times of King Bakenranef, 8th century BC. The most recent land-reform act has been legislated in Scotland in 2016 AD. Balancing fairness and ownership rights is a major concern in such reforms [Sellar, 2006; Hoffman, 2013; Wightman, 2015; MacInnes and Shields, 2015] .
Geometric cake models
The most prominent cake-model is a one-dimensional interval, in which case the pieces are often required to be contiguous sub-intervals. Some exceptions are:
1. The cake is a 1-dimensional circle and the pieces are contiguous arcs [Thomson, 2007; Brams et al., 2008; Barbanel et al., 2009] .
2. The cake is a 2-dimensional territory that lies among several countries. Each country should receive a piece adjacent to its border [Hill, 1983; Beck, 1987] .
3. The cake is 2-dimensional and the pieces are rectangles determined by the agents [Iyer and Huhns, 2009] .
4. The cake is 2-dimensional and the pieces must be squares or fat polygons [Segal-Halevi et al., 2017] .
5. The cake is 2-dimensional; the geometric constraints are connectivity or convexity [Devulapalli, 2014] .
6. The cake is multi-dimensional and the pieces are simplexes or polytopes [Berliant et al., 1992; Ichiishi and Idzik, 1999; Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni, 2009] .
Many natural 2-dimensional settings have not been studied yet. For example, the setting studied here, where the cake is a rectilinear polygon and the pieces should be rectangles, has not been studied.
It is important to distinguish geometric cake-cutting from the geometric knapsack problem [Arkin et al., 1993; Adamaszek and Wiese, 2015] . In the latter there is a single value-function that should be optimized. In cake-cutting, there are n agents with different value-functions, and the goal is to guarantee each agent a value higher than some threshold.
Price of fairness.
The price-of-fairness has been studied in various contexts, such as routing and load-balancing [Bertsimas et al., 2011; Bertsimas et al., 2012] and kidney exchange [Dickerson et al., 2014] . The price-of-fairness in cake-cutting has been studied in two settings:
• The cake is a one-dimensional interval and the pieces must be intervals [Aumann and Dombb, 2010] . The utilitarian-price-of-proportionality in this case is Θ( √ n).
• The cake is arbitrary and the pieces may be arbitrary [Caragiannis et al., 2012] . The utilitarian-price-ofproportionality in this case is Θ( √ n) too.
Both papers study the price of other fairness criteria such as envy-freeness and equitability, but do not study the price in Nash-welfare. Additionally, they do not handle twodimensional geometric constraints such as rectangularity or convexity. Several authors study the algorithmic problem of finding a welfare-maximizing cake-allocation allocation in various settings:
1. The cake is an interval and the pieces must be connected [Aumann et al., 2013] ; 2. The cake is an interval and the pieces must be connected, and additionally, the division must be proportional [Bei et al., 2012] ; 3. The cake and pieces are arbitrary, and the division must be envy-free [Cohler et al., 2011] .
4. The cake and pieces are arbitrary, and the division must be equitable [Brams et al., 2012] .
Future Work
Two-dimensional division , the price-of-fairness and the redivision problem are relatively new topics, and there is a lot of room for future research in each of them.
Handling other geometric constraints
Two steps in our redivision algorithm are sensitive to the geometric constraints: the allocation-completion (Step #1 in Theorem 4), and the Even-Paz protocol (Lemma 16). We describe how these steps are affected by alternative constraints.
1. Convexity in three or more dimensions. The Even-Paz protocol can easily operate on multi-dimensional boxes or other convex objects, requiring the agents to cut using hyperplanes parallel to each other. However, we currently do not have an allocation-completion algorithm for convex objects, or even for boxes, in three or more dimensions.
2. Path-connectivity in two dimensions. If the pieces have to be path-connected but not necessarily convex, then the allocation-completion step is much easier and no blanks are created. However, it is not clear how to use the Even-Paz protocol in this case: when the cake is connected but not convex, making parallel cuts might create disconnected pieces.
3. Two pieces per agent. 2. Pareto-efficiency. From an existential point of view, Pareto-efficiency does not add much difficulty. Both rproportionality and w-ownership are preserved by Paretoimprovements. Therefore, if there exists a division satisfying r-proportionality and w-ownership (or democraticownership), then there also exists a Pareto-optimal division satisfying these properties. However, it may not be easy to find such a division algorithmically.
Improving the constants
Our redivision protocol is 1/3 or 1/4 or 1/5-proportional (depending on the geometric constraint). We see two potential ways to improve these numbers.
1. In Step #2 of our redivision protocol, we add n helper agents, so the total number of agents is 2n. But in the Step #3, each agent chooses either its helper or its normal agent, while the other agent is "wasted". If we could know the n choices of the agents in advance, we could employ only n agents overall, subtracting 1 from the denominator of the constant (the constants would become 1/2 or 1/3 or 1/4). We may view this as a strategic game in which each agent has two possible strategies: "normal" vs. "helper". We conjecture that a purestrategy Nash equilibrium exists in this game, and it corresponds to an allocation satisfying the partial-proportionality and democratic-ownership requirements. While finding a Nash equilibrium is usually a computationally-hard problem, it may be useful as an existential result.
2. In Lemma 16, we treat each existing piece Z j as an "island" and insist that each new piece be entirely contained in an existing piece, i.e, we do not cross the existing division lines. This may be desirable in the context of land division, since it respects the Uti Possidetis principle [Lalonde, 2002] . However, , it implies that the resulting division can only be partially-proportional and never fully proportional(as shown by the remark following Lemma 16)it may be possible to improve the proportionality guarantees by devising a different redivision procedure that crosses the existing division lines.
These possibilities invoke the following open question: what is the highest level of proportionality that is compatible with democratic-ownership?
Price-of-fairness
It is not clear whether the upper bounds of our Theorems 9-12 are tight.
In particular, for the case of interval cake and interval pieces, there is a lower bound of Ω( √ n) on the utilitarian price of proportionality. However, we could not generalize it to the price of partial proportionality, and it is interesting to know which of the following two options is correct: (a) there is a lower bound of Ω( √ n) matching our Theorem 10, or (b) the actual price of partial-proportionality is o( √ n). The latter option would imply that partial-proportionality is asymptotically "cheaper" than full proportionality, in social welfare terms.
Regarding the Nash price-of-fairness, it is known that with arbitrary pieces, every Nash-optimal allocation is envy-free (hence also proportional), so the Nash price of envy-freeness (hence, of proportionality) is 1. However, this is not true when the pieces must be connected. We do not have a lower bound for this case.
A more challenging future research topic is to extend our techniques to other fairness criteria, particularly envyfreeness and equitability, in multi-dimensional cakes with rectangular pieces.
A Fair Division of a Rectilinear Polygon
This appendix shows what proportionality guarantees are possible when the cake is a rectilinear polygon, the pieces have to be rectangles (parallel to the sides of the cake), and there are no ownership requirements. It can be seen as a baseline for Theorem 8.
Lemma 19. Let C be a rectilinear polygon with T reflex vertices. It is possible to divide C among n agents such that the value of each agent is at least 1/(n + T ) of the total cake value:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : V i (X i ) ≥ V i (C) n + T
The fraction 1/(n + T ) is the largest that can be guaranteed.
Proof. A rectilinear polygon with T reflex vertices can be partitioned in time O(poly(T )) to at most T + 1 rectangles [Keil, 2000; Eppstein, 2010] . Denote these rectangles by Z j , so that:
Apply the archipelago-division protocol of Lemma 16 with m = T + 1. The value-guarantee per agent is at least 1/(n + m − 1) which is at least 1/(n + T ), as claimed.
For the upper bound, consider a staircase-shaped cake with T + 1 stairs. as illustrated below (for T = 4):
All agents have the same value-measure, which is concentrated in the diamond-shapes: the top diamond is worth n and each of the other diamonds is worth 1 (so for all agents, the total cake value is n + T ).
Any rectangle in C can touch at most a single diamond. There are two cases:
(a) All n agents touch the top diamond. Then, their total value is n and at least one of them must receive a value of at most 1.
(b) At least one agent touches one of the T bottom diamonds. Then, the value of that agent is at most 1.
In any case, at least one agent receives at most a fraction 1/(n + T ) of the total cake value, as claimed.
